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Abstract
Research shows that the choice of relationship exit strategy by the instigator of exit can have 
significant negative consequences for the party that is being dropped. In this study we focus on 
what we coin as kind exit, where the risk of harm to the supplier as a result of the buyer’s 
relationship termination is low. In line with current research, which is suggesting that the 
characteristics of a buyer-supplier relationship play a critical role in the instigator’s choice of 
exit strategy, we examine the link between the buyer’s perception of its relationship with the 
supplier and the manner in which the buyer-supplier relationship ends. We posit that this 
phenomenon is causally complex and context dependent, and as such, there will be multiple 
types of buyer-supplier relationships that will lead to a kind exit. To uncover these types, we 
examine 315 terminated buyer-supplier relationships in manufacturing and service sectors in 
the UK, employing fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). Our results show that 
contrary to extant literature, there is not one relationship type that leads to a kind exit; instead, 
we uncover four alternative equifinal configurations of relationship dimensions and two 
exogenous factors. 
Keywords: buyer-supplier relationships, relationship exit, transaction cost economics, social 
exchange theory, fsQCA, configurations
1. Introduction
Effective management of buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs) is a cornerstone of a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Zaefarian, Thiesbrummel, Henneberg & Naudé, 2017). 
Depending upon firms’ specific needs, buyers and suppliers form relationships that vary across 
multiple dimensions, such as duration, closeness and commitment (Ganesan, 1994; Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999). Business circumstances, firms’ needs, behaviors and performance of actors 
in a relationship change over time, and when this happens, it is not uncommon for a firm to re-
evaluate the value they are getting from a relationship. While sometimes this re-evaluation 
results in the adjustment of the relationship – e.g. a decrease or increase in resource 
commitment, an alternative option is to end the relationship. 
While in some cases the ending of a relationship is predetermined and agreed in 
advance by both the buyer and the supplier (e.g. at the end of a project, or after the realization 
of mutual objectives), research shows that in about 50% of the cases, relationship exit is 
triggered unilaterally by one party (Gulati, Sytch, & Mehrotra, 2008; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). 
Mismanagement of relationship exit can have devastating and far-reaching implications for 
both companies. While relationship exit can be initiated by either the buyer or the supplier at 
any point during the relationship (Ryan & Tähtinen, 2012), studies indicate that exit, when not 
managed correctly, can bring operational disruptions, reputational damage, financial losses and 
even bankruptcy, and that the party that being dropped is usually more vulnerable than the 
instigator of the exit (Alajoutsijärvi, Möller, & Tähtinen, 2000; Pressey and Mathews 2003; 
Gulati et al., 2008). An example of an organization suffering the damaging effects of 
relationship exit is Sames, an American paint application OEM. Sames entered a strategic 
partnership with a large Japanese car manufacturer, only to be dropped unexpectedly after years 
of investment in R&D, trial runs and attempts to adapt to the automaker’s mounting demands, 
ultimately resulting in the supplier’s bankruptcy (Gulati et al., 2008). 
Research into buyer-supplier relationships to date, has tended to focus on the front end 
of these relationships, i.e. the initial engagement and development of a relationship. Meanwhile 
limited attention has been devoted to the final stage, where parties disengage from a 
relationship; notable exceptions include Alajoutsijärvi, et al. (2000), Pressey & Mathews 
(2003), Gulati et al. (2008); Ryan & Tähtinen (2012). The intent of our study is to investigate 
the link between the buyer’s perception of its relationship with the supplier, and the manner in 
which the buyer-supplier relationship ends once the buyer has decided to disengage from it. In 
particular, we are interested in what we call kind exit, which refers to a relationship dissolution 
where the likelihood of negative operational, reputational and financial damages for the 
supplier is low. This, we argue, depends on whether the buyer: a) clearly communicates the 
exit decision to the supplier in a way that reduces the ambiguity about the relationship’s 
continuation; and b) offers the supplier an opportunity to negotiate exit provisions, such as 
resource re-deployment or knowledge and technology transfers (Baxter, 1985; Alajoutsijärvi, 
et al., 2000).
Based on experience from practice and suggestions from the extant literature 
(Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen, Blois & Mittilä, 2007), we 
posit that the buyer’s perception of its relationship with the supplier will play a role in how the 
relationship ends. To fully describe a buyer-supplier relationship, we adopt four relationship 
dimensions/characteristics from Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) – asset specificity, 
opportunistic behavior, administrative control and transaction uncertainty, and four from 
Social Exchange Theory (SET) – trust, information sharing, flexibility and dependence. When 
it comes to relationship exit strategies, we adopt Baxter’s (1985) relationship disengagement 
model. To examine this link empirically, we collect and analyze cross-sectorial data from 315 
terminated buyer-supplier relationships in the UK. 
In addition to treating buyer-supplier relationships and relationship exit as multi-
dimensional, we also adopt a contingency-theoretic, configurational approach (Karatzas, 
Johnson & Bastl, 2016). This means that we are primarily interested in how different 
dimensions of a BSR interact with each other to form constellations (Meyer, Tsui & Higgins, 
1993) that elicit a kind exit, rather than in the net effects of individual dimensions. In line with 
previous empirical studies in the area of industrial relationships (e.g. Karatzas et al., 2016; 
Zefarian et al. 2017; Heirati, Hennenberg, Richter, & Harste, 2018), we posit, that the 
relationship between BSR dimensions, contextual factors, and relationship exit is a causally 
complex phenomenon. Complex causality has three properties – conjunction, equifinality and 
asymmetry (Misangyi, Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, Crilly, & Aguilera, 2016), which in this 
context would mean that: a) a kind exit will result from the interdependence of multiple 
conditions rather than have one single cause (conjunction), b) there will be more than one 
pathway (i.e. configuration) to a kind exit (equifinality), c) both the presence and the absence 
of some attributes may be connected to the outcome as part of different, equifinal 
configurations (asymmetry). We specifically adopt fsQCA – fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis – which is an analytical technique equipped to tackle complex causality (see Ragin, 
2008; Fiss, 2011, Misangyi et al., 2016).
This study makes the following contributions: Our first, contribution is to show that the 
influences of relationship dimensions on kind exit are causally complex. We empirically 
uncovered four configurations of dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships and contextual 
factors that lead to the same outcome – a kind relationship exit. Our second contribution reveals 
that contrary to the current suggestions in the literature (e.g. Alajoutsijärvi et al. 2000; Giller 
& Matear; 2001; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002), buyer-supplier relationships that do not display 
relational properties such as trust, information sharing, and informality, can still lead to a kind 
exit, as long as the buyer perceives itself to be dependent on the supplier. This also clarifies the 
current confusion in the literature (e.g. Tähtinen et al., 2007) regarding the role of dependence 
(and its interaction with relational properties of a buyer-supplier relationship) in the choice of 
an exit strategy that considers the supplier’s welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we continue with the theoretical 
background where we introduce Baxter’s (1985) relationship disengagement model and 
present the relationship dimensions grounded in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Social 
Exchange Theory (SET). This is followed by the methodology, where we describe the 
empirical setting, data collection and configurational analysis. We then present the results and 
close with the discussion, limitations and directions for further research.
2. Theoretical background
In this section we present background literature pertinent to our study’s focus. It is divided in 
three parts: we begin by defining relationship exit and introducing Baxter’s (1985) model of 
relationship dissolution. This is followed by the introduction of relationship characteristics, 
grounded in TCE and SET and the justification for their adoption. In the third part we bring 
the previous two bodies of literature together and present the current state of knowledge related 
to the relationship influences on BSR exit, which we then summarize in two theoretical 
conjectures that guided our empirical investigation. 
2.1. Relationship exit and exit strategies
Relationship dissolution is the last stage in the relationship life-cycle (Dwyer, Schurr 
& Oh, 1987), and it unfolds through the following key steps (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Halinen 
& Tähtinen, 2002): relationship assessment; decision making; dyadic communication, and 
disengagement. The outcome of this process is either a total exit from a BSR, where the parties 
have no intention to continue the relationship in the future, or a partial exit, where, for example, 
a buyer terminates the relationship with one division of the supplier but continues doing 
business with another (Michalski, 2004). Here, we focus on total exit, and consider the BSR to 
end completely when one party (e.g. the buyer) is not continuing any business with its 
counterpart (e.g. the supplier).
One of the most critical aspects of relationship ending is the approach – i.e. the exit 
strategy – that the disengager adopts once the exit decision has been taken and it is the essence 
of the third and fourth step described earlier. While early research suggested that exit strategy 
is as simple as a buyer ceasing purchase of goods and services from a supplier (e.g. 
Hirschaman, 1970; Helper, 1993), more recent works show a considerable complexity in 
approaches to relationship exit in business (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Pressey & Mathews, 
2003; Tähtinen et al., 2007; Eckerd & Girth, 2017). To capture this, we adopted Baxter’s (1985) 
relationship disengagement model. The model was originally empirically developed in the field 
of social psychology, and later adopted and applied in the context of business-to-business 
relationships (e.g. Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Giller & Matear, 2001; Pressey & Qiu, 2007; 
Ryan & Tähtinen, 2012). It proposes four exit strategies, based on their directness and 
orientation: silent, disguised, negotiated and communicated. Table 1 introduces each exit 







Silent Exit Strategy (SES)
 Communication of exit decision: No intention or need
 Decision instigated by: Can be unilateral or bilateral if 
both parties realize that the relationship has lost its 
significance.
 Duration: Disengagement can take a long time.
 Consequences for the disengager: Gives up some of 
its own interests.
 Consequences for the partner: Tries to avoid hurting 
the partner, however it increases the uncertainty over the 
relationship continuation.
Disguised Exit Strategy (DES)
 Communication of exit decision: No intention to 
communicate actual decision and reasons behind it. Exit 
intentions are conveyed through disguised tactics by 
deliberately making the relationship unsustainable for 
the other party.
 Decision instigated by: Unilateral by the disengager.
 Duration: Disengagement can take a long time.
 Consequences for the disengager: Secures its own 
interests.
 Consequences for the partner: Hurt the partner as it 
does not consider its interests and increases uncertainty 









Negotiated Exit Strategy (NES)
 Communication of exit decision: directly and 
explicitly communicated to the partner.
 Decision instigated by: Can be unilateral or bi-lateral.
 Duration: Opportunity for quick disengagement if 
parties agree on terms.
 Consequences for the disengager: Gives up some of 
its own interests, and willing to negotiate the terms of 
disengagement.
 Consequences for the partner: Avoids hurting the 
partner; eliminates ambiguity over the relationship 
continuation; gives the partner an opportunity to 
negotiate terms of disengagement.
Communicated Exit Strategy (CES)
 Communication of exit decision: directly and explicit 
communicated to the partner.
 Decision instigated by: Unilateral by the disengager.
 Duration: Quick
 Consequences for the disengager: Secures its own 
interests.
 Consequences for the partner: Hurts the partner as it 
gives the partner no opportunity to negotiate terms or 
save the relationship; eliminates ambiguity over the 
relationship continuation.
Source: Adapted from Baxter (1985) and Alajoutsijärvi, et al., (2000)
Directness refers to how the disengager communicates the exit decision to its 
counterpart. Indirect or uninformed strategies (i.e. silent and disguised), are characterised by 
the disengager’s lack of intention to communicate the exit decision to its counterpart or by 
masking the real intentions to exit through stealth tactics. For example, in the case of a 
disguised exit strategy, the disengager would use rapid order changes, pressures for 
unreasonable price decreases, or increases in service levels as stealth tactics in order to make 
the relationship unsustainable and force the supplier out of the relationship (Pressey & Salassie, 
2007; He, Ghobadian, & Gallear, 2013). This lack and/or ambiguity in communication 
introduces considerable uncertainty in the relationship regarding its continuation, often leading 
to a prolonged disengagement process, and/or the creation of a false sense of certainty where 
the supplier is continuously investing in what is ultimately a lost cause. This implies difficulties 
for the supplier to ever recover such investment. Direct or informed strategies (i.e. negotiated 
and communicated) on the other hand, offer no doubt over the disengager’s intentions, since 
the exit decision is clearly and explicitly communicated to the counterpart. 
Orientation relates to the extent of the disengager’s concern over the interests and views 
of its counterpart. For example, a supplier could lose a substantial amount of business, be 
unable to re-deploy relationship-specific investments, suffer reputational damage, experience 
operational disruptions, etc. In other-oriented strategies, (i.e. silent and negotiated), the 
disengager considers also the interests of the counterpart. Both parties offer each other a so 
called “face-saving opportunity” to prevent unnecessary confrontation and harm (Baxter, 1985, 
Tähtinen & Vaaland, 2006; Epstein & Keller, 2012). This is most evident in the negotiated exit 
strategy, where, for example, the buyer besides clearly communicating its exit intentions to the 
supplier, is also willing to negotiate the terms of disengagement, with an intent to avoid 
hostility and mitigate losses (Rutherford, Anaza & Philips, 2012). In self-oriented strategies 
(i.e. disguised and communicated) the disengager’s main concern is to secure its own interests, 
irrespective of the negative consequences that the exit decision may have for its counterpart. 
For example, the buyer can unilaterally decide to terminate the relationship and inform the 
supplier about the decision, but this gives the supplier no opportunity to save the relationship 
or negotiate exit terms. Although such an approach removes any ambiguity, it will very likely 
hurt the supplier and lead to hostility in the disengagement phase of the relationship (Gulati et 
al., 2008).
The differences in communication and orientation among the four exit strategies have 
a variety of consequences for the disengager and its partner, and inevitably lead to 
discrepancies between what Tähtinen et al. (2007) call preferred versus appropriate ways of 
ending a relationship. While the two self-oriented exit strategies (disguised and communicated) 
are economically rational from the disengager’s point of view, they can inflict substantial harm 
to the supplier, given their unilateral, often abrupt, confrontational, and self-interested nature. 
The two other-oriented strategies (silent and negotiated) may be more appropriate, since the 
buyer considers the interests of the counterpart as well (Tähtinen et al., 2007). Moreover, 
between the two, a negotiated exit strategy is the supplier’s best alternative as it offers an 
opportunity to negotiate terms and conditions of disengagement (e.g. process duration, asset 
redeployment, rate of order de-escalation), while it also removes any ambiguity over the 
continuation of the relationship (in contrast to silent strategy). We argue, and validate 
empirically through interviews with practitioners, that as we move from a disguised to a 
negotiated exit strategy, the likelihood of financial, operational and reputational damages for 
the supplier is lower. In other words, the more the buyer’s exit strategy resembles a negotiated 
one, the less harmful the outcomes of disengagement are likely to be for the supplier, i.e. the 
kinder the exit. 
2.2. Characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships
It is generally accepted that business-to-business relationships are complex and thus 
characterized by multiple dimensions (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Vesalainen & Kohtamaki, 
2015, Zaefarian et al., 2017). To capture these dimensions, we adopt two theoretical lenses; 
Social Exchange Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. There are three reasons for this 
adoption: 
First, both theoretical lenses have been extensively used to describe BSRs, considering 
dimensions such as, long-term orientation, relational norms, governance structures, 
relationship uncertainty, adaptation and collaboration (e.g. Heide & John, 1992; Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perrone, 1998; Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Williamson, 2008; Nyaga, et. al., 2013; 
Heirati et al., 2018). 
Second, the key premise of SET is that positive interactions over time will produce 
relational exchange norms (e.g. trust, information sharing and flexibility) that will govern an 
exchange relationship (Lambe, Wittmann & Spekman, 2001), which makes the relationship an 
effective form of exchange governance. TCE on the other hand, emphasizes the need for the 
creation of a formalized governance, due to the assumption of partners’ opportunism which 
limits the effectiveness of relational governance postulated by SET (Rindfleich & Heide, 1997; 
Lambe et al., 2001). In consequence, SET has a higher explanatory and predictive power in 
longer-term, relational relationships, where partners develop mutual trust and relational norms 
of behavior, whereas TCE explains short-term, opportunistic relationships better, where the 
two parties have to rely on transactional forms of governance. As a result, and in line with 
arguments by Nyaga et al. (2013) and Heirati et al., (2018), we argue that the two theories 
should be treated as complementary, which is why we adopted both of them to describe the 
characteristics of the studied BSRs. 
Third, the extant evidence from the relationship exit literature suggests that the 
characteristics of BSRs, and specifically the strength of relational bonds (e.g. trust, relational 
norms, opportunism), the type of relationship infrastructure (e.g. relationship-specific 
investments and governance structures) and the dependence between the buyer and the 
supplier, will likely influence the choice of relationship exit strategy (Alajoutsijarvi et al., 2000; 
Giller & Matear, 2001; Halinnen and Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen et al., 2007). Thus, the selected 
TCE and SET dimensions can holistically describe a BSR characteristics relevant in the context 
of relationship exit and are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Relationship dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships
Theoretical lens Determinant Definition of the determinant
Asset specificity
Asset specificity refers to investments made by a firm that are of considerably less value 
outside of the focal relationship (Heide & John, 1980, p. 27)
Opportunistic 
behavior
Opportunistic behavior involves the deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit 
promises about one’s expected behavior (Archol & Gundlach, 1999).
Administrative 
control
Administrative control refers to institutional instruments and governance mechanisms, e.g. 
formal contracts, that are put in place by the parties as safeguards, to enable them to 





Transaction uncertainty refers to a difficulty of predicting the action of another party in 
terms of product/service availability, volume stability and buying behavior (Noordeweir, 
John & Nevin, 1990).
Trust
Inter-organizational trust is defined as expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfill 
obligations, will behave in a predictable manner, and will act and negotiate fairly when the 
possibility for opportunism is present. (Zaheer et al., 1998, p.143)
Information 
sharing
Information sharing is defined as “the extent to which critical, often proprietary, 
information is communicated to one’s partner in a timely manner.” (Mohr & Spekman, 
1994, p. 139).
Flexibility
Flexibility refers to partners common beliefs about the appropriate behavior in the case of 
changes in contractual agreements. Particularly, willingness to adapt and change original 
contract terms, in the face of specific requests of the other party (Caniëls & Gelderman; 




A firm’s dependence upon an exchange relationship is a function of the degree to which 
rewards sought and gained from the relationship are not available outside of the relationship 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996)
Guided by the available literature on relationship exit, we also consider two exogenous 
factors that may influence the buyer’s choice of relationship exit strategy. The first one is 
relationship duration, which refers to the length of the relationship between the buyer and the 
supplier. It is generally accepted that relationship closeness evolves over time (Schurr, Hedaa 
& Geersbro, 2008), and the longer the relationship, the more ‘opportunities’ the buyer and the 
supplier have to develop mutual understanding, trust and commitment (Dwyer et al., 1987). In 
consequence, and in line with suggestions by Giller & Matear (2001), we posit that longer 
relationships, which are conducive to relationship closeness, are less likely to result in a self-
oriented and abrupt relationship exit.
The second contextual factor that we consider is the size difference between the buyer 
and the supplier. Size of the supplier relative to the buyer can be seen as an indicator of a power 
differential between the two actors. Large firms tend to have more resources and more buying 
power, which makes them less dependent on small suppliers, resulting in power asymmetry. 
As Gulati et al. (2008) showed, it is much easier for a large firm to walk away from a 
relationship with a small supplier in an abrupt and non-communicated fashion (than the other 
way around), consequently leaving the small supplier vulnerable and exposed to financial and 
operational disruptions. 
2.3. Relationship exit strategies and their relationship determinants
Current literature is in broad agreement that characteristics of buyer-supplier 
relationships affect relationship exit. Given the multitude of buyer-supplier relationship 
characteristics, differences in this consensus start emerging around which relationship 
characteristics actually play an influencing role on the choice of relationship exit strategy. A 
study by Giller and Matear (2001), for example, showed that prior closeness between the buyer 
and the supplier, characterized by the presence of trust and social bonds, will lead the 
disengager to opt for an other-oriented exit strategy (i.e. silent or negotiated), whereby it will 
consider not only its own but also the counterpart’s interests. Similarly, Alajoutsijärvi et al. 
(2000) showed that presence of social bonds in close buyer-supplier relationships plays an 
important role in minimizing potential damage to the counterpart during the disengagement 
process and once the exit is completed. This suggests that the disengager will seek to avoid an 
abrupt and/or self-oriented relationship ending and will likely behave in accordance with the 
relational norms and shared values jointly developed with the supplier prior to the 
disengagement. 
In addition to the consideration of relational characteristics of BSR in the choice of exit, 
Caniëls and Gelderman (2010) suggested that high levels of asset specific investments in a 
relationship will likely make the buyer seek to negotiate its departure, to protect their 
investment that would otherwise be lost with the dissolution of the relationship (Harrison, 
2004). This is in contrast to the suggestion by Giller and Matear (2001), who argue that when 
a disengager has invested substantial resources in the relationship and has a lot to lose from the 
relationships’ dissolution, the preferred choice would be to adopt self-oriented exit strategies 
(i.e. disguised or communicated), and minimize its own losses. To add to these contrasting 
views, research suggests that in highly unbalanced relationships, the less dependent party will 
likely choose a self-oriented strategy, knowing that their counterpart has little or no leverage 
over them to force the negotiation of exit terms (Tahtinen et al., 2007; Gulati et al., 2008). 
While such behavior is economically rational from the disengager’s point of view, it can 
substantially harm the counterpart, and it is for this reason that the more dependent party should 
be given an opportunity to either enter in negotiations over exit terms, or to gain additional 
time and seek potential alternatives in sales or supply markets (Gulati et al., 2008).
Moreover, most studies treat individual relationship characteristics (e.g. trust, asset 
specificity or dependence) in isolation from each other or describe relationships with high level 
constructs such as ‘close’ or ‘collaborative’, ignoring their multidimensional nature. In 
practice, managers rarely seek to manage a single characteristic of a relationship, but rather 
struggle with the complexity of multiple characteristics at once (Zaefarian et al., 2017). 
Management scholars however (see for example Siggelkow, 2002; Tushman and O’Reilley, 
2002), have long recognized that organizational outcomes (in our case buyer’s choice of a kind 
exit) tend to depend on the alignment or a conflict among interdependent attributes (in our case 
relationship dimensions), which commonly occur together, forming multidimensional 
constellations or configurations of distinct characteristics (Misangy et al., 2017). In line with 
this, we posit that the effects of relationship characteristics on the choice of exit strategy may 
be conjunctural and context-dependent, rather than isolated. In fact, various equifinal ‘recipes’ 
for the same outcome (i.e. exit) may exist; while causation may be asymmetric, with both the 
presence and the absence of a relationship characteristic (e.g. asset specificity) being linked to 
the outcome as part of different configurations. In line with the argument of Meyer et al. (1993), 
the number of configurations of distinct conceptual attributes (i.e. relationship characteristics 
in our case) is limited and predetermined because of (p. 1176): “the attributes’ tendency to fall 
into coherent patterns”. Given the limited number of such configurations and their relative 
stability over time (Miller, 1986, 1996), configurational logic helps with their identification 
and the elucidation of the complex interactions among the constructs.
Seeing various industrial marketing phenomena as causally complex, and applying 
configurational logic to examine them, has already generated fruitful insight that clarifies, or 
complements, previous insight coming from traditional correlation-based approaches (e.g. 
Frösén, Jaakkola, Churakova, & Tikkanen, 2016; Karatzas et al., 2016; Zaefarian et al., 2017; 
Heirati et al., 2018). 
In line with the reviewed literature and the previous works addressing causally complex 
phenomena and using a configurational approach (e.g. Karatzas et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 
2017; Ambroise et al., 2018), we outline two theoretical conjectures: 
1. There will be more than one, qualitatively different, configurations of buyer-supplier 
relationship characteristics and contextual factors that lead to a kind exit. 
2. The configurations of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics and contextual factors 
leading to a kind exit, will more likely reflect relational rather than transactional 
relationship properties.
3. Methodology
To identify the configurations of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics that are 
sufficient for a kind relationship exit, we employed fsQCA – an analytic technique that is fully 
equipped to tackle causal complexity (see Ragin, 2008). Due to its suitability for investigating 
causally complex phenomena, its ability to systematize qualitative data analysis and produce 
insights from quantitative data that traditional correlational techniques cannot, fsQCA is 
becoming increasingly popular in various social sciences. Full explanations of the method 
include Ragin (2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012), while detailed empirical 
expositions in the management, operations, supply chain management, and marketing 
disciplines include, among others, Fiss (2011), Karatzas et al. (2016) and Zaefarian et al. 
(2017).
Aligned with our research focus, and with previous applications of TCE (e.g. Heide and 
John, 1990; Terpend, Krause & Dooley, 2011) and SET (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Huo, Flynn, 
& Zhao, 2017) in a buyer-supplier context, the unit of analysis is a terminated buyer–supplier 
relationship. As detailed below, the unit of the data collection is a key informant from the 
buying firm in a BSR. As such, we solely (but deliberately) capture the buyer’s perception of 
the various relationship dimensions. Since in our study it is the buyer who chooses to disengage 
from the relationship, we argue that it is their own perception of the relationship that influences 
their choice of exit strategy. With these in mind, our study design aims at identifying key 
informants at buying organizations, knowledgeable and experienced enough to recall the 
characteristics of a BSR from which their organization recently disengaged, and in which they 
were personally involved in managing the exit. 
3.1. Sampling and data collection
We obtained data via an online survey which was administered throughout 2015. The 
instrument was initially pre–tested by six supply chain and marketing academics and four 
industry representatives familiar with exit in BSRs. The pre–test was designed to ensure that 
the questionnaire was concise and clear, and that the items provided face validity for the 
constructs examined. Based on the feedback, minor changes were made, and the instrument 
was then converted into an on–line survey. The target population comprised UK–based 
manufacturers and service providers operating in a range of sectors. To cover a range of 
industries, we purchased two independent databases from mailing list companies, with an 
overall of 4,815 unique firm-contacts. 
The survey respondents we sought were the supply chain managers and purchasing 
executives of the buying firms involved in managing exit from a relationship with one of their 
suppliers. This sampling criterion ensured that the target respondents possessed the relevant 
practical knowledge, establishing them as key informants. Studying BSRs by surveying supply 
chain managers is a widely accepted practice in buyer-supplier relationship research (e.g. Zhao 
et al., 2007). A link to the self–administered online questionnaire was sent to these informants 
along with a cover letter highlighting the study’s objectives. Target respondents were 
encouraged to participate by offering them entitlement to a summary report of the research 
findings. Participation was voluntary, and anonymity and confidentiality were assured. 
The questionnaire was sent out via electronic emailing in two waves. Initially, 281 
responses were received. After a gap of three weeks, a reminder was sent electronically to those 
target respondents that did not respond during the first wave. This resulted in another 53 
responses. Data screening forced us to omit 19 questionnaires due to incomplete information, 
resulting in 315 usable responses (6.54% response rate).
Detailed sample composition and profiles of buyers and suppliers are shown in Tables 
3, and 4. NES was the most popular strategy (35.9%) to end a BSR, followed by CES (27.6%), 
SES (20.3%) and DES (16.2%). This suggested that the buying firm’s choice of exit strategy 









< 1 76 24.1
1–2 101 32.1
Procurement Managers 224 71.1
2–3 41 13.0
3–4 41 13.0
Supplier Rel. Managers 79 25.1
4–5 36 11.4
> 5 20 6.4
Board Level Executives 12 3.8
Total 315 100.0 315 100
Table 4




Annual Sales in 
GBP (mill.)
# % Industry # %
< 50 109 34.6 < 1 124 39.3 Manufacturing 143 45.4
51–250 93 29.5 1–10 79 25.1 Agriculture 26 8.3
251–500 51 16.2 10.1–50 45 14.3 IT & Telecom 25 7.9
501–1000 30 9.5 > 50 67 21.3 Transport 24 7.6




Total 315 100.0 315 100 315 100.0
< 50 23 7.3 < 1 52 16.5 Manufacturing 111 35.2
51–250 108 34.3 1–10 91 28.9 Agriculture 13 4.1
251–500 96 30.5 10.1–50 87 27.6 IT & Telecom 25 7.9
501–1000 73 23.1 > 50 85 27.0 Transport 14 4.5




Total 315 100.0 315 100 315 100.0
3.2. Measurement development and assessment
Measures for the independent variables (in fsQCA language: casual conditions) were 
adopted from the extant literature (see Table 6 in the next section). Regarding the two 
contextual factors (size and relationship duration), two ordinal variables were created to 
operationalize the original categories (see Tables 3 and 4). As such, relationship duration varied 
between ‘1’ (corresponding to a relationship that lasted less than a year) and ‘6’ (representing 
one that exceeded 5 years), while firm size had five levels (from ‘1’ if employees < 50 to ‘5’ 
if employees > 1000).  We decided to use ordinal scales for relationship duration and size 
because sometimes respondents do not have the precise knowledge to respond to a continuous 
variable.  Particularly in the case of relationship duration, where the relationship could have 
been in place for many years.  However, we acknowledge that we could have used more 
granular ordinal scales to improve precision. To capture the buyer’s choice of an exit strategy, 
four distinct scenario descriptions (see Table 5) were developed from the extant literature 
(Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Pressey & Mathews, 2003). The informants were asked to consider 
a relationship with a supplier that their firm had recently ended and were allowed to select only 
one exit scenario before attempting to answer the remaining questions.
Table 5
Scenario descriptions for dependent variables
Dependent variable Scenario descriptions
Silent exit
We felt no need to communicate with the supplier that we were leaving the relationships. For example, due to its 
lack of importance, the relationship with the supplier just fizzled out.
Disguised exit
We did not directly indicate to the supplier our intention to leave the relationship but deliberately created a 
situation where the relationship became unsustainable. For example, we deliberately delayed payments to the 
supplier.
Communicated exit
We informed the supplier that we had decided to end the relationship. For example, we never wanted to give 
another chance to the supplier to restore an unsatisfactory relationship. 
Negotiated exit
We negotiated how the relationship should end. For example, both partners (our company and the supplier) 
acknowledged that the disengagement was inevitable and discussed matters with mutual understanding.
3.3. Validity and reliability
We assessed the construct validity and reliability of our measures by following 
established guidelines outlined by Anderson & Gerbing (1988). The results of the factor 
analysis are shown in Table 6. All measurement items had lower loadings on the constructs 
that they were not supposed to measure, indicating uni–dimensionality.
Table 6














Our system was tailored to using a particular product/service of the 
supplier.
0.761
AS3 We made investments dedicated to our relationship with the supplier.
0.946
0.776
Heide and john 
(1980), Zaheer et 
al., (1998)
Opportunism
OP1 The supplier altered information in order to get what they wanted. 0.830
OP2 The supplier was always sincere with us. 0.857









The supplier demanded detailed contracts before starting business with 
us.
0.840
AC2 Responsibilities of both parties were clearly specified in a contract. 0.857







TU1 The supplier provided stable availability of required product/service. 0.879
TU2 Working with the supplier was easy. 0.834
TU3 The supplier provided us products/services in the required volumes. 
0.902
0.832
Noordewier et al. 
(1990) and Zaheer 
et al. (1998)
Trust
TR1 The supplier always negotiated fairly with our company 0.683
TR2 The supplier did not keep their promises. 0.769
TR3 The supplier was trustworthy.
0.909
0.815
Rempel and Holmes 
(1986); Zaheer et 
al., (1998)
Information Exchange
IE1 We frequently exchanged information with the supplier. 0.867
IE2 We exchanged more information than required with the supplier. 0.868
IE3 The supplier kept us informed about changes that may affect us.
0.895
0.910
Heide and John 
(1992); Caniëls & 
Gelderman (2010)
Flexibility
FX1 The supplier responded flexibly. 0.778
FX2 The supplier adjusted rapidly according to changing circumstances. 0.806





Yilmaz et al., (2005)
Dependence
DP1 We were dependent on the supplier. 0.803
DP2 The supplier was difficult to replace 0.827
DP3 The supplier was costly to lose
0.937
0.807
Lusch and Brown 
(1996); Caniëls & 
Gelderman (2010)
Note: 7-point Likert scales were used for all constructs.
In addition, the CR of each construct was greater than the average variance extracted 
(AVE) value for the construct, providing evidence of convergent validity. Regarding 
discriminant validity, the squared correlation between each construct and other constructs was 
smaller than the average variance extracted (AVE) for the construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
Moreover, both the maximum shared variance (MSV) and average shared variance (ASV) of 
each construct were smaller than its AVE (see Table 7), further rendering support for 
discriminant validity (Chae, Choi, & Hur, 2017). Summary descriptive statistics and 
correlations can be found in Table 8.
Table 7
Measure of reliability and validity
CR = Composite Reliability; AVE =Average Variance Extracted; MSV = Maximum Shared variance; ASV = Average Shared Variance.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Asset specificity 1
2 Opportunistic behavior -.445** 1
3 Administrative control .500** -.234** 1
4 Transaction certainty .544** -.373** .326** 1
5 Trust .645** -.421** .302** .673** 1
6 Information sharing .132** -.030 .532** .038 -.076 1
7 Flexibility .644** -.478** .431** .429** .551** .118* 1
8 Dependence .726** -.577** .430** .542** .686** .028 .705** 1
9 Relationship duration .641** -.377** .373** .463** .463** .108 .477** .515** 1
10 Size Asymmetry .091 -.025 .124* .232** .196** .105 .023 .104 .062 1
Mean 3.54 4.99 3.95 3.41 3.55 2.82 3.33 3.35 2.75 .527
Standard Deviation 1.665 .966 1.455 1.391 1.285 1.098 1.248 1.548 1.545 1.527
Notes: N = 315; ** p < 0.01,* p < 0.05; (two–tailed test)
3.4. Initial sample analysis
We compared the responses from the two databases (n1=178; n2=137) to ensure that the 
samples came from the same population. There were no statistically significant differences in 
terms of the descriptive variables, so we combined the two samples in the analysis.
3.5. Non-response bias and common method variance
We tested for non–response bias by comparing the early (n1=270) vs. late (n2=45) 
waves of returned surveys, assuming that the latter represents the non–respondents (Armstrong 
and Overton, 1977; Chen, Sohal, & Prajogo, 2013). The two samples did not differ statistically 
Item description CR AVE MSV ASV
Asset specificity 0.817 0.599 0.413 0.266
Opportunistic behaviour 0.867 0.684 0.171 0.075
Administrative control 0.880 0.710 0.283 0.152
Transaction uncertainty 0.885 0.720 0.384 0.161
Trust 0.801 0.574 0.407 0.237
Information sharing 0.830 0.777 0.235 0.042
Flexibility 0.843 0.641 0.377 0.213
Dependence 0.853 0.659 0.413 0.232
significantly in terms of any descriptive characteristic, suggesting that non–response bias is not 
a concern and that the participating firms represent the population from which they were drawn.
Furthermore, following Podsakoff et al. (2003), we used a combination of ex ante 
procedures to reduce the plausibility of method biases as an explanation of the relationships 
observed between the constructs of interest (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004). For example, we 
protected respondent anonymity, reduced evaluation apprehension, reduced item ambiguity 
during the pretest of the data collection instrument (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000), and 
obtained data from two independent groups of respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). As the 
questionnaire was answered by a single respondent in each company, we also examined 
common method variance (CMV) at the ex post stage by employing Harman’s single–factor 
test. An un–rotated factor analysis using the eigenvalue–greater–than–one criterion revealed 
eight distinct factors that accounted for 84.97% of the variance while the first factor captured 
only 11.59% of the variance, suggesting absence of CMV.
4. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
The two main stages of any fsQCA investigation are the calibration of the raw data, and 
the identification of necessary and/or sufficient (configurations of) conditions for a given 
outcome, which we present next. 
4.1. Measure calibration
An integral step of fsQCA is the transformation of the raw data into fuzzy set 
membership scores. In this section, we present the calibration of the outcome (exit strategy), 
and summarize the process for the causal conditions in Table 9. An extensive description of 
the process can be found in Appendix I. 
4.1.1. Outcome: Relationship exit strategy
There are only four possible relationship exit strategies, hence the outcome variable is 
categorical in nature with four possible values. However, as it has already been suggested, the 
buyer’s choice of a disguised exit strategy could be seen as the least desirable outcome from 
the supplier’s point of view, while a negotiated exit strategy could be thought of as the most 
desirable one. It could thus be assumed that there is an implicit ‘order’ to these four exit 
strategies, in terms of the degree of harm they cause the supplier. As such, the variable can be 
treated as ordinal and reflect exit kindness. To confirm our theoretical assumption regarding 
the order of preference of the four exit strategies in terms of how kind the subsequent exit 
would be, and transform the variable into a fuzzy set, we followed a ‘direct assignment’ 
approach. This makes use of external expert knowledge for assigning fuzzy set membership 
scores directly to the raw data (see Verkuilen, 2005). We detail the procedure below.
We interviewed 20 managers who had experience in business-to-business relationships 
that had been terminated, in which their company was the supplier of a product or service to a 
buyer. We described the four exit strategies to them, and allowed them to ask any clarification 
questions. We then asked them to freely rank the four types in terms of preference, after 
considering the possibility and severity of any negative business implications of each type of 
relationship exit. The implications we asked them to implicitly consider included the impact 
on operations (e.g. production disruption, excess inventory), financial performance (e.g. 
profitability), market share and reputational damage. The next step involved the participants 
declaring their most and least preferred exit types. Having done this, we asked them to assume 
that their most preferred strategy took a score of ‘100’ and the least preferred one took a score 
of zero. Given that, as a final step we asked them to assign a score from zero to 100 to the 
remaining two exit strategies. The level of agreement amongst the interviewees was almost 
perfect; apart from one individual out of the 20, the generated rank order of exit strategies was 
identical. Namely, NES > CES > SES > DES. The sole interviewee whose order of preference 
diverged from this pattern, considered DES to be more preferable than SES (but only 
marginally). In line with our prior theorizing, the generated rank order, and the move from 
disguised towards a negotiated strategy suggests a ‘kinder’ exit for the supplier, substantiating 
our theoretical assumption. 
To generate the fuzzy set membership scores of the four strategies, we assigned a value 
of 0.95 to the unanimously most preferable exit type (NES) to signify full set membership in 
the ‘set of relationships dissolving kindly for the supplier’ (see Ragin, 2008). Similarly, we 
assigned a value of 0.05 to the least preferable strategy (DES) to indicate full non-membership 
in the defined set. To get the fuzzy scores for the two exit strategy types in-between, for each 
one we took the average evaluation of the respondents and divided it by 100. This translated 
into a score of 0.225 for the silent, and 0.575 for the communicated exit strategies respectively.
Table 9
Measure calibration specifics 
Variable name Original measure Corresponding fuzzy set





Type of exit 
strategy
Four categories




The set of relationships dissolving 
kindly for the supplier
Direct assignment 




Supplier size minus 
buyer size
(in terms of number 
of employees band)













The set of relationships with a 
dependent buyer
Trust




The set of relationships with high 
levels of information exchange
Transaction 
uncertainty
The set of relationships with a 
supplier that provided high 
transaction certainty
Flexibility
The set of relationships with a 
highly flexible supplier
Asset specificity
The set of relationships with high 
asset specificity
Opportunism








The set of highly formalised 
relationships
Totally fuzzy and 
relative (TFR) based 
on Cheli and Lemmi 




4.2.1. Analysis of necessity
None of the ten causal conditions was found to be necessary for a kind exit, since none 
of the respective sets was a consistent superset of the outcome set. This means that there is no 
condition that is present in all instances of a kind exit.
4.2.2. Analysis of sufficiency
We used ‘QCA’ (Dusa, 2007), a software package developed for the R environment, 
because of the flexibility it provides to conduct the enhanced standard analysis (ESA). This is 
an extension of the standard analysis (SA) of Ragin (2008), which removes from the 
minimisation process untenable assumptions and incoherent observed configurations (see 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), and could thus be purported to generate more logically and 
theoretically coherent parsimonious and intermediate solutions.
The initial step was to construct the truth table and order the configurations according 
to their consistency scores. As is customary in large-N fsQCA studies like ours, we chose a 
frequency threshold of 2, meaning that no configuration with a single case was taken into 
consideration, due to their small empirical relevance. We chose a consistency threshold of 0.97, 
at a point just before a relatively large drop in consistency (see Ragin 2008). Being faithful to 
the ESA, from the logical reminders to be included in the minimisation process we removed 
the contradictory simplifying assumptions (i.e. those reminders which, during the 
minimisation, end up being considered sufficient for both the outcome and its negation). We 
also removed an empirically observed configuration that is simultaneously a subset of both the 
presence and the absence of the outcome (hence, incoherent). The result of the minimisation is 
the (enhanced) parsimonious solution. To generate the (enhanced) intermediate solution, the 
additional step is to further remove the difficult counterfactuals by postulating directional 
expectations for each causal condition. We expect that it is the presence of all conditions, apart 
from administrative control and opportunism, that can bring about a kind exit. Reasonably, the 
less opportunistic the supplier has been, the more likely is the buyer to take into consideration 
the supplier’s interests when exiting the relationship, so we expect the absence of this condition 
to be associated with the outcome. When it comes to administrative control, the intuition is 
conflicting; a relationship primarily governed by formalised contractual agreements may have 
proven too rigid for the buyer, but at the same time, the supplier may have been shrewd enough 
to insert clauses in the contract prescribing a negotiation stage in case of relationship 
dissolution. We thus treat administrative control as ‘neutral’ with regard to the outcome of kind 
exit.
5. Results
Our analysis uncovered four distinct configurations of BSRs that result in a kind exit. 
Following the conventional way to present both intermediate and parsimonious solutions (e.g. 
Fiss, 2011; Fröseén, Jaakkola, Churakova & Tikkanen, 2017), the configurations are 
graphically depicted in Figure 1. Three of them (configurations 1, 2 and 4) have neutral 
permutations, i.e. their core conditions (that form the parsimonious solution) are combined with 
different sets of contributing conditions. Core conditions are those for which the data indicate 
a relatively stronger relationship with the outcome (Fiss, 2011); they are the “decisive causal 
ingredients because they do not require any assumptions” (Misangyi et al., 2016: p.276).
The overall solution coverage of the intermediate solution indicates that 71.50% of 
membership in the outcome set is explained by the four configurations, while the overall 
solution consistency of 0.94 is well above the suggested minimum of 0.75 (Ragin, 2008). 
Solution consistency measures the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of 
solution terms) is a subset of membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2008); the higher the 
consistency, the more confident one can be that the configurations reliably lead to the outcome.
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 Configuration 4
Permutation a b a b a b
Trust    
Flexibility     
Information 
exchange   
Dependence      
Admin 
control     
Asset 
specificity     




asymmetry     
Relationship 
duration  
Consistency 0.970 0.963 0.952 0.984 0.953 0.979 0.985
Raw coverage 0.330 0.384 0.313 0.290 0.302 0.577 0.321
Unique coverage 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.023 0.146 0.008
Overall solution coverage 0.715
Overall solution consistency 0.940
Core causal condition present  Core causal condition absent
   Contributing causal condition present    Contributing causal condition absent
Note: In configuration 4, the presence of core contributing causal condition for Transactional uncertainty means the relationship was 
characterized by high levels of transaction certainty.
Figure 1
Configurations leading to kind exit
5.1. Configuration 1
The first configuration consists of three core causal conditions: the presence of high 
flexibility and high dependence, and the absence of administrative control. These are combined 
with three contributing conditions: either the absence of both information exchange and size 
asymmetry (Permutation 1a) or the presence of high asset specificity (Permutation 1b). 
This configuration showcases the importance of supplier flexibility and buyer’s 
dependence (in the absence of specific and detailed contracts) for a kind exit. While promising 
practice suggests that relationship exit provisions should be an integral part of buyer-supplier 
contracts, this configuration suggests that, either this practice is not always followed, and/or 
buyer-supplier exchanges are simply not always governed by formalized and detailed contracts. 
In the absence of these, the supplier could, in theory, be in the mercy of the buying company 
as to whether or not they will be informed about the latter’s exit decision and offered an 
opportunity to part on mutually agreed terms. 
However, the buyer’s perception of: a) the supplier’s flexibility and; b) its dependence 
on the supplier, could act as ‘safeguards’ for the buyer not to simply walk away and leave the 
supplier exposed to operational, financial and reputational losses. This result suggests that if 
the buyer thinks that the supplier has been able to provide them with a unique offering (for 
example, one that makes the supplier a single or sole source provider), or, if the supplier 
represents a relatively large proportion of the total buyer’s spend, it is difficult for the buyer to 
terminate the relationship solely under their conditions. Moreover, supplier flexibility, i.e. the 
ability to adapt in good-faith to changing circumstances and buyer’s needs and wants, is a trait 
that must have been appreciated by the buyer throughout the relationship, leading them to 
reciprocate in the disengagement stage by displaying interest in the supplier’s welfare. 
5.2. Configuration 2
The four core conditions of the second configuration are high levels of flexibility, high 
asset specificity, high size asymmetry and the absence of opportunism. They are combined 
with five contributing conditions: either the absence of administrative control (Permutation 2a) 
or the presence of high trust, high information exchange, high dependence and long duration 
(Permutation 2b). The two permutations reflect two alternative versions of a truly relational 
relationship between a large supplier and a considerably smaller buyer.
This configuration suggests that smaller buying firms will inform big suppliers about 
their exit decision and engage with them in negotiations, when the buyer has invested in the 
relationship and when the buyer believes the supplier has demonstrated flexibility and has not 
acted opportunistically. Relationship-specific investments in systems that allow customized 
support, tailored manufacturing processes, or integrated logistics, have, in principle, little value 
outside of a focal relationship. In such situations, it is logical to expect that a (smaller) buyer 
is motivated to explore the possibility of recouping these investments and negotiating a smooth 
redeployment of resources after the dissolution of the relationship. This, however, is unlikely 
to guarantee the desired outcome for the supplier, since the buyer’s investment in the 
relationship primarily motivates the buyer to secure its own interests first. 
Accompanying core and supporting conditions – i.e. supplier flexibility and absence of 
opportunism, combined with characteristics such as trust, information exchange and 
dependence are indicators of a long-term and close relationship. Both the buyer and the supplier 
would have pursued common goals during the course of the relationship and will consequently 
try to avoid hurting each other when it ends. The presence of relational behavior ‘balances’ a 
buyer’s temptation to pursue solely its own interests in the disengagement phase of the 
relationship. 
5.3. Configuration 3
The third configuration is defined by five core conditions: the absence of trust, 
information exchange, administrative control and size asymmetry, and the presence of buyer 
dependence. 
This configuration was somewhat surprising. This is because all the other 
configurations suggest that it is the presence (not the absence) of various relational norms that 
in combination with other conditions lead to a kind exit. Configuration 3 goes against this logic, 
suggesting that even a small supplier whose relationship with the buyer lacks trust, information 
sharing and contractual safeguards, can still experience a kind exit, as long as the buyer 
considers itself to be dependent on the supplier. These are the cases whereby the buyer may be 
forced rather than willing to inform, or negotiate with, the supplier. We can easily imagine such 
a situation in traditional bottleneck purchasing arrangements (see Kraljic, 1983), where the 
buyer is heavily dependent on what can be a relatively small supplier of a unique technology 
or service, which the buyer cannot source from elsewhere – at least in the short-term. The 
supplier enjoys a dominant position and can charge premium prices, and is unwilling, or 
unable, owing to resource constraints, to maintain a close relationship with the buyer. If such 
a relationship ends, for example when the buyer develops a secondary source, it may attempt 
to inform the supplier and potentially negotiate the provision of goods or services during the 
transition period, since it is hard for the buyer to do without these, even in the short term.
5.4. Configuration 4
The fourth and last configuration consists of the following three core conditions: the 
presence of high trust, high dependence and high transactional certainty. These were combined 
with six contributing conditions: the presence of high flexibility and high asset specificity 
(Permutation 4a) or high administrative control, asset specificity, size asymmetry, relationship 
duration, and the absence of opportunism (Permutation 4b).
This configuration is similar to the second one and illustrates the interplay between the 
social and economic dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships. However, it also emphasizes 
the great importance of transaction (un)certainty. It suggests that buyers perceive positively 
those suppliers which were able to provide them with a stable availability of products/services 
and reliable order fulfillment, in an easy-to-work-with manner. The reason for it is that 
uncertainty created by the supplier – stemming from its performance, behavior, or volume of 
supply, requires adaptation and leads to issues in information processing on the part of the 
buyer, which may result in a failure to meet financial and operational targets. 
But although the historical transaction certainty is a good indication that the buyer will 
also consider the supplier’s interests in the exit process, suppliers should not expect this to be 
enough for a kind exit. As this configuration suggests, the supplier’s ability to provide certainty 
in the exchange has to be accompanied by a perceived state of dependence on the supplier, and 
the supplier’s trustworthy behavior. In a relationship permeated by trust, the buyer seems to 
maintain the same spirit until the end of the relationship and reciprocate by offering the supplier 
a more favorable way out of the relationship. It is worth noting that the combination of 
dependence, trust and transaction certainty, with perceived supplier flexibility and asset 
specificity, is by orders of magnitude the most empirically relevant configuration (testified by 
its high unique coverage). This suggests that most relationships that ended in a non-harmful 
manner for the supplier exhibited these characteristics. Reasonably, the buyer has no reason to 
not consider the supplier’s interest in the disengagement phase (whatever the reason for that 
disengagement might be), if the buyer perceived itself to be dependent on that supplier and felt 
the supplier exhibited operational certainty, flexibility and trustworthiness.
5.5. Sufficiency analysis for the negation of the outcome
The analysis for the negation of the outcome showed that the absence of relationship 
duration and the absence of dependence are necessary conditions for an exit that is not kind for 
the supplier, with consistency scores of 0.918 and 0.892 respectively. The relevance and 
coverage scores (see Dusa, 2018) are very high for the necessity relationship between the 
absence of dependence and the negation of the outcome (0.825 and 0.859 respectively), while 
in the case of duration they can be considered as borderline acceptable (0.59 and 0.518). These 
suggest that, for the supplier to be at risk of being harmed by the dissolution of the BSR, it is 
necessary that the relationship is short-term and the buyer does not perceive itself to be 
dependent on the supplier. In other words, only short-term relationships with low levels of 
perceived buyer dependence dissolve in such a way that can harm the supplier. This however 
does not mean that a long-term relationship or buyer dependence, by themselves, are sufficient 
for a kind exit. As already shown, relational traits have to be in place for this to happen.
Figure 2 presents the parsimonious and intermediate solutions for the analysis of 
sufficiency for the negation of the outcome. The consistency cut-off was 0.96, with a frequency 
cut-off of 2 cases. Configurations with Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) < 0.6 
where omitted from the minimisation process. The results can be readily summarized without 
getting into the detail of each configuration: All relationships ending in a way that is possible 
to harm the supplier do not exhibit aspects of relational behaviour. This is not a surprise, but it 
emphasizes even more the importance of relational relationships for a kind exit. It is 
encouraging for the suppliers that relationships permeated by relational norms do not seem to 
end badly.
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 4
Permutation a b a b c d a b
Trust      
Flexibility       
Information 
exchange   
Dependence        
Admin 
control       
Asset 
specificity      
Opportunism      
Transactional 




duration        
Consistency 0.974 0.945 0.973 0.948 0.971 0.979 0.959 0.946
Raw coverage 0.434 0.449 0.446 0.398 0.444 0.474 0.390 0.354
Unique coverage 0.010 0.028 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.004 0
Overall solution coverage 0.682
Overall solution consistency 0.931
Core causal condition present  Core causal condition absent
   Contributing causal condition present    Contributing causal condition absent
Figure 2
Configurations leading to unkind exit
6. Discussion
By following configurational logic, this study examined the relationship between the 
buyer’s perception of its relationship with the supplier and the manner in which their 
relationship ends once the buyer has decided to disengage from it. In doing so, this work makes 
several theoretical and practical contributions.
Research to date broadly proposes that the characteristics of a buyer-supplier 
relationship, prior to its ending stage, determine how the ending of the relationship unfolds 
(Alajoutsijärvi et al. 2000; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen et al; 2007). However, these 
studies either examine these characteristics (e.g. trust, dependence, asset specificity) in 
isolation from each other, or describe buyer-supplier relationships with high level constructs 
such as, close, relational or collaborative, ignoring their multi-dimensionality (Cannon and 
Perreault, 1999; Zaefarian et al., 2017). It is here, where we position our first theoretical 
contribution. By positing that the relationship between BSR characteristics, contextual factors 
and what we termed kind exit, is causally complex, we departed away from simplistic 
descriptions of BSRs, and showed that it is not one single characteristic, but rather, alternative 
combinations thereof that lead to the desired outcome. In line with our first theoretical 
conjecture – i.e. that more than one, qualitatively different configuration of BSR characteristics 
and contextual factors will lead to a kind exit, we uncovered four distinct configurations. Three 
of those configurations (1, 2 and 4) exhibit various aspects of relationality, which suggests that 
for whatever reason the buyer decides to disengage, out of goodness, reputation or reciprocity 
for a harmonious relational relationship, it will consider the supplier’s interests at the exit stage 
and try not to harm them. This is an important finding, which shows, that the positive effects 
of close and collaborative buyer-supplier relationships are not only manifested in the ongoing 
exchange of a buyer-supplier relationship (Dwyer et al., 1987; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Cao & 
Zhang, 2011; Heirati et al., 2018), but they also influence the relationship disengagement stage. 
Moreover, we showed that the four configurations leading to a kind exit, consist not 
only of relationship characteristics, but also contextual factors, specifically, the relative size of 
the supplier and the duration of the relationship. Being larger than the buyer is generally 
positive but being relatively smaller is not condemning. Crucially, we found that even 
asymmetrically small suppliers in transactional relationships with large buyers, have a chance 
of exiting a relationship in good terms, as long as the buyer perceives itself to be dependent on 
the smaller supplier’s offering. Our results also generated deep and interesting insight about 
the role of relationship duration. While it is largely irrelevant for a kind exit, the absence of a 
long relationship is a very strong indicator of a ‘hard’ exit for the supplier. Specifically, the 
analysis for the negation of the outcome suggests that the absence of a long relationship is a 
necessary condition for a potentially harmful exit. In other words, only short-term relationships 
(which are also perceived by the buyer as non-relational in various ways) end in a way that 
could harm the supplier. 
Various relational aspects of buyer-supplier relationships (as perceived by the buyer), 
grounded in both TCE and SET (i.e. trust, flexibility, information sharing, non-opportunistic 
behavior and transactional certainty), on their own do not guarantee the favorable outcome for 
the supplier, as they almost always interact with high levels of dependence. It is here where we 
position our second theoretical contribution. While the literature, implicitly or explicitly, 
argues that greater levels of relationality in buyer-supplier relationships will increase the 
likelihood that the disengager will consider the interest of its counterpart (Alajoutsijärvi et al. 
2000; Giller & Matear; 2001; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002), we showed that the same outcome 
is possible also in the absence of such relational elements. Configuration 3 showed that 
relationships that, from the buyer’s perspective, do not exhibit relational properties do not 
always imply ‘hard’ exit for a small supplier. In this situation it is a buyer’s dependence on the 
supplier that counterweighs the absence of perceived relational properties in the relationship. 
We argue that the uniqueness of the supplier’s offering, relative scarcity of alternative suppliers 
on the supply market, or the combination of the two, creates switching difficulties for the buyer 
(Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007; Handley and Benton, 2012). When the buyer’s dependence on 
the supplier is high, theory suggests that the buyer will have to carefully manage their position 
to not become too vulnerable, and will normally place more attention to the quality of the 
relationship throughout the exchange with the supplier (Tangpong et al., 2008, Siemieniako 
and Mitrega, 2018). We found that this is also the case in the relationship dissolution stage, 
through offering the supplier a kind exit. This insight – i.e. the interaction between the 
relational elements of BSR and the buyer’s dependence on the supplier, provides an important 
refinement to our second theoretical conjecture, where we initially proposed that kind exit is a 
function of relational rather than transactional relationship characteristics. 
 Moreover, the role of buyer’s dependence in offering the supplier a kind exit is 
potentially good news for small, resource-constrained suppliers that are unable to build 
complex, close-knitted relationships with their customers. As long as they are able to provide 
those customers with an offering that is unique enough to make them dependent, the risk that 
the latter will end the relationship overnight and walk away from their commercial arrangement 
should decrease. The critical importance of dependence was further illustrated through the fact 
that its absence emerged as a necessary condition for a ‘hard’ exit. Only relationships involving 
a buyer that does not perceive itself to be dependent on the supplier end up in a possibly harmful 
way for the supplier.
This study has also important managerial implications for both buyers and suppliers. 
While it shows that there is no single relationship profile leading to a kind exit, it also identifies 
some key levers that managers have at their disposal to avoid a hard exit (e.g. dependence, 
trust, asset specificity, administrative controls).  For suppliers, particularly small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) with limited time and resources, the study shows that taking actions to 
develop buyer dependence, will drastically decrease the risk associated with the buyer walking 
away from this relationship in an abrupt and/or uniformed fashion.  In addition, suppliers can 
seek to build strong relationship through displaying trustworthy behaviors, flexibility, and 
providing transactional certainty in order to avoid hard exit.  Results also show that more 
explicit approaches such as relationship specific investments and imposing administrative 
controls (i.e. contractual safeguards) can be effective in decreasing the likelihood of a hard 
exit, under certain circumstances.  For buyers, the research provides a map showing alternative 
routes for supplier disengagement, with the configurations indicating different conditions 
underpinning a kind exit.  This can help buyers better understand the actions of suppliers. For 
instance, a supplier’s insistence for asset specific investments or exit clauses in the contract, 
would be signs of the supplier’s fear of a hard exit and might prompt the buyer to adjust its 
negotiation strategy.
7. Limitations and further research
Notwithstanding its value for theory and practice, this research has few limitations 
which offer opportunities for further research. The first one relates to the focus of the study; 
we only explored the role of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics in relationship exit. 
Literature (e.g. Michalski, 2004) indicates that exit triggers – i.e. the reasons why a disengager 
decided to terminate the relationship in the first place, may also influence the choice of a 
disengager’s exit strategy. This can be either a single ‘catastrophic’ event related to the 
counterpart’s performance or behavior, an accumulation of unsatisfactory performance and 
behavior over time, a mutually agreed ending, or an event external to the relationship – e.g. 
changes in regulations. Further research should focus on investigating these reasons and linking 
them with exit strategy decisions, which should extend the findings of this work.
Second, given the multi-dimensional and context dependent nature of relationship exit 
and its determinants, other contextual factors may play a role in a buyer’s or supplier’s choice 
of exit strategy. One interesting contextual factor are cultural characteristics (i.e. country of 
origin) (Pressey and Qiu, 2007; Gulati et al., 2008). Given that our data collection was limited 
to buying firms in the UK and that we did not account for the country of origin of supplying 
firms, future research should explore whether and/or to what extent the choice of relationship 
exit strategy is influenced by cultural characteristics of both buying and supplying firms. 
Third, our measure of buyer’s dependence on the supplier is narrow. Future research 
could expand this measure and adopt the construct of relative dependence - the perceived 
difference between its own and the partner’s dependence on the relationship (see Hocutt, 
1998 for further details) or total interdependence if data is collected from both sides of a dyad 
(see Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007, 2010 for more further details). 
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Appendix I: Calibration of the causal conditions
Size asymmetry: An asymmetry in size (in terms of employee number) could imply scale and 
power asymmetries between the buyer and the supplier, and differences in the level of 
professionalism. The mean size difference between suppliers and buyers was 0.53, suggesting 
that in this sample, the suppliers, on average, were slightly larger companies than the buyers. 
Since employee size was captured as an ordinal variable with 5 levels, we created a measure 
of size asymmetry by subtracting buyer size from supplier size, which could take values from 
-4 (when a supplier with less than 50 employees dealt with a buyer with over 1000 employees) 
to 4 (when a supplier with over 1000 employees dealt with a buyer of less than 50). It was thus 
intuitive to transform this measure into a fuzzy set (‘the set of relationships with an 
asymmetrically large supplier’) using the direct method of calibration and applying the 
following thresholds: ‘4’ to indicate full membership in the set, ‘-4’ to indicate full non-
membership, and ‘0’ as the cross-over point (implying size symmetry). 
Relationship duration: We transformed relationship duration into ‘the set of long 
relationships’ using the direct method of calibration and applying the following thresholds. We 
used substantive knowledge from the extant literature on relationship lifetime value and long-
term orientation of BSRs (e.g. Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani & Narayandes, 1995; Reinartz & 
Kumar, 2003) to designate the cross-over point (i.e. the point of ‘maximum ambiguity’) to be 
3-4 years. A relationship less than a year old was deemed to be fully out of the set, while a 
relationship of over five years old was considered fully in. 
Relationship dimensions: Treating ordinal variables (like Likert scales) as interval ones, 
and mechanically transforming them into fuzzy sets is a common practice in the management 
literature (e.g. Frambach et al., 2016) even though it is not advisable by fsQCA methodologists 
(see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). As Dusa (2018) explains, Likert response scales are 
bipolar in nature, constructed (for example) from a negative end being ‘strongly disagree’, to 
a positive end being ‘strongly agree’. In contrast, fuzzy sets are unipolar; using trust as an 
example, for the purpose of this work all cases need to be assigned a membership score in the 
‘set of relationships with a trustful supplier’. A mechanical transformation of a bipolar scale 
using the midpoint as cross-over, and the endpoints as full inclusion and full exclusion 
thresholds is conceptually problematic (Dusa, 2018). More importantly, oftentimes Likert type 
variables are skewed towards one of the ends, producing measures where scores are clustered 
and variance is small. This could occur because of social desirability bias or because 
respondents make implicit causal connections between the different constructs. Granted, 
having three or more items per construct and a large sample justifies the treatment of the 
averages (or summated scores) as interval variables, but the issues surrounding the calibration 
of such variables in fsQCA are not guaranteed to disappear.
To counter this issue, a recent development in the fsQCA literature is to calibrate 
ordinal (or even interval) variables using a transformation method that adapts Cheli’s and 
Lemmi’s (1995) Totally Fuzzy and Relative (TFR) approach. This method is based on rank 
orders and uses the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the observed data. 
The normalised version of the original formula, that guarantees that values are restricted 
between 0 and 1, is presented below (see Dusa, 2018).
                      (1)𝑇𝐹𝑅 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  ( 0, 𝐸(𝑥) ‒ 𝐸(1)
1 ‒ 𝐸(1)  )
where E() is the CDF. The formula basically calculates the distance from each value of the 
CDF to the CDF of the first value (1) in the Likert response scale and divides that to the distance 
between 1 (the maximum possible fuzzy score) and the same CDF of the first value in the same 
Likert response scale. This transformation ensures that the resultant fuzzy values are not 
mechanically spaced equally between 0 and 1, because they depend on the particular 
distribution of the observed data. This is very helpful, giving guaranteed suitable fuzzy scores 
even for highly skewed data coming from ordinal scales. We thus adopt this calibration method 
for all relationship dimensions that have been measured using 7-point Likert scales, and for 
each dimension we take the average fuzzy score across its 3 items.
